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I
INTRODUCTION

Nonconventional construction techniques such as construction management
and design-build/fast track have developed as methods designed to reduce the
total time between the date of decision to build and the date of project completion.
Any such time savings predominantly benefits the owner. The sooner the project
is completed, the sooner it can serve its intended purpose-a factory can produce
goods; an office building can produce rental income; a refinery can produce gasoline products; or a power plant can generate electricity. A time savings can also
result in reduced construction and financing costs including lower labor rates,
material and fuel costs, and interest expense. Because it is the owner who elects to
utilize a nonconventional construction technique, it is the owner who must accept
not only the benefits but also the costs of such methods.
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the use of construction management
and design-build/fast track from the perspective of specialty trade contractors, the
group performing the majority of the actual physical construction work. The
article will first review the role of specialty contractors under the traditional fixed
design and prime contractor-subcontractor system. It will then discuss the expectations of the specialty contractors when nonconventional techniques are to be
utilized. Finally, it will evaluate how nonconventional methods have actually
worked for specialty trade contractors.
II
THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF SPECIALTY TRADE CONTRACTORS

A specialty trade contractor is a contractor who performs one specific craft or
trade on a construction project. On a typical project, the term would include,
among others, the electrical, mechanical (heating and air conditioning), plumbing,
roofing, insulation, plaster/drywall, painting, and landscaping contractors. Even
on a moderate sized project of fifteen to twenty-five million dollars it is common to
have twenty and sometimes as many as forty to fifty specialty contractors, each
performing its respective trade.
On a conventional construction project, the owner normally provides a prime
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contractor with a fixed set of plans and specifications for the entire project. The
prime contractor agrees to provide the owner with a completed structure in
accordance with those plans within a definite period of time, usually for a fixed
price.' Thereafter, the prime contractor typically enters into subcontracts with
various specialty trade contractors, each of whom agrees to perform a designated
trade portion of the prime contract work. As a subcontractor on a conventional
project, the specialty trade contractor is responsible to the prime contractor; the
specialty contractor has no legal relationship with the owner.
From the specialty contractor's point of view, there are several major drawbacks to the conventional contracting system of construction. The first problem
arises at the contract formation stage and is often the cause of subsequent disputes
and litigation between prime contractors and subcontractors. At the time of contracting, the specialty contractor typically agrees to perform all work associated
with its trade. Frequently, the owner's designer has divided the project plans and
specifications by trade. 2 Nevertheless, the specialty contractor must review and
interpret all the project design documents to assure that all its trade work is
accounted for. Even then, it is not uncommon for a specialty contractor to fail to
account for trade work described in some segment of the project design documents
other than in the portion designated to its trade. 3 When such omissions become
known, the prime contractor, who has agreed to present the owner with a complete
project, is often pitted against the specialty contractor, who may refuse to perform
the omitted work without additional compensation. Eventually, one or the other
will perform the work, but often without compensation.
A second drawback also arises at the contract formation stage. The typical
subcontract agreement requires the subcontractor to perform its work in accordance with all the terms and conditions of the prime contract with the owner.
Because the subcontractor lacks privity of contract with the owner, however, it has
no direct access to the owner. Therefore, any questions the subcontractor has
about the prime contract must go first to the prime contractor. The owner then
responds to the prime contractor, who gives the answer to the subcontractor. Not
only does this cause delay, but as with any message, the more parties through
1. Federal and state governments have designated formal advertising and the award of firm fixedprice contracts to be the preferred method of contracting. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304(a), 2305 (1976); 32
C.F.R. § IA-2-102.1 (1981) (defense contracts); 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1976) and 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.102 (1981)
(civilian agency contracts).
2. The typical contract specifications, though presented as one package, are generally divided into
sections. For example, the contract specifications may be divided as follows:
I. General Requirements
II. Site Work
III. Concrete
IV. Not Used
V. Metals, Structural & Miscellaneous
VI. Not Used
VII. Moisture Protection
VIII. Electrical
IX. Mechanical
3. Electrical and mechanical specifications are often sources of dispute. Though the design specifications require the installation of certain equipment, they do not unambigously specify the trade responsible
for the installation.
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which it must pass, the more likely it is that the original meaning will be lost or
obscured.
In addition to those drawbacks which arise from contract formation, during
construction the very nature of the prime contractor-subcontractor relationship is
often the source of problems. Indeed, it is not unusual that a prime contractor's
interests and motivation will run contrary to those of its subcontractors. There are
various examples of such contradictory interests. First, since the prime contractor
is actually performing a substantial portion of the physical work on the project
with its own labor force and equipment, its primary function is that of a builder.
The function of administration, including the oversight of subcontractors, is secondary and consequently may not receive the necessary attention.
Even when the prime contractor does attend to the adminstration of the project, contrary interests can manifest themselves. This is particularly true in the
administration of the project schedule. The prime contractor is responsible to the
owner for scheduling the project work. The prime contractor's natural motivation,
however, is to schedule its own work in the most advantageous manner. The efficient scheduling of subcontractor work, though important, is still a secondary
consideration.
Furthermore, on a conventional project, the owner generally agrees to pay its
prime contractor on a periodic (usually monthly) basis. In turn, the prime contractor typically makes payment to its subcontractors contingent upon payment by
the owner. Thus, if the owner delays payment to the prime contractor, for
whatever reason, the prime contractor can delay its payments to the subcontractors. 4 Moreover, a prime contractor may purposely delay payment of progress
payments, and especially retainage, to the subcontractors even after receiving payment from the owner. This enables the prime contractor to earn interest on the
subcontractors' money or to use the funds as a bargaining chip to resolve disputes
with a subcontractor. Even when the prime contractor does pay the subcontractors, he may still withhold a certain portion (usually five to ten percent) of the
subcontractors' payments as retainage until the work is complete. 5 This can be in
addition to the retainage the owner withholds on payments to the prime contractor. Thus, a subcontractor's actual payments can be reduced by fifteen to
twenty percent.
A further area of conflicting interst is the processing of changes. Obviously, the
prime contractor is most interested in processing the changes to its portion of the
work. A subcontractor's changes result in little financial benefit to the prime con4. In contrast, art. 12.4.3 of the Standard Form of Agreement Between Contractor and Subcontractor
of the American Institute of Architects gives a subcontractor the right to demand payment when he bears
no fault for the delay. American Institute of Architects, Standard Form of Agreement Between Contractor
and Subcontractor, Doc. A401, art. 12.4.3 (Apr. 1978) [hereinafter cited as AIA Contractor-Subcontractor
Agreement].
5. Many prime contractors' standard subcontracts are more restrictive in their subcontractor payment
provisions than the AIA Document A401. It is not unusual that a private subcontract precludes progress
payments to a subcontractor until payment is received by the prime contractor regardless of the owner's
reason for delay or nonpayment. In addition, the subcontract may preclude release of a subcontractor's
retainage until the owner accepts the entire project, not just the subcontractor's work. This can be especially costly to trade subcontractors whose work is completed early.
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tractor and more often are regarded as impediments to the resolution of the latter's
changes. Thus, prime contractors may process their subcontractors' changes as
secondary matters and have been known to negotiate away the subcontractors'
changes in return for the owner's acceptance of the prime contractor's pricing.
A final perceived drawback of the conventional system is its frequent entrapment of the subcontractors in any deterioration of the owner-prime contractor
relationship. As set forth above, a subcontractor's receipt of progress payments
and retainage from the prime contractor often is conditioned upon the prime contractor's prior receipt of payments from the owner. It is not unusual, particularly
as a troublesome project nears completion, for an owner to withhold part or all of
the progress payments as leverage or protection against prime contractor claims.
Consequently, the subcontractor who has continued working and incurring costs
may not be paid until the owner and prime contractor resolve their differences or
the subcontractor takes legal action. Should the owner-prime contractor relationship continue to deteriorate so that the owner terminates the prime contract, all
subcontracts usually will be likewise terminated even though the subcontractors
have performed their work on time and in accordance with the contract
specifications.
Such drawbacks in the conventional contracting system of construction as
described above, in conjunction with expected improvements under nontraditional
construction methods, have led specialty trade contractors to welcome such techniques as construction management and design-build/fast track.
III
EXPECTATIONS OF SPECIALTY CONTRACTORS ON CONSTRUCTION

MANAGEMENT AND DESIGN-BUILD/FAST TRACK PROJECTS

An owner's primary objectives in using the nonconventional construction management and design-build/fast track systems are to save time and to reduce costs.
The specialty contractor's primary objective under either the traditional or nonconventional system is to perform its contract profitably and in conformance with
contract plans and specifications.
In comparison to the traditional construction project, nonconventional construction systems promise the specialty contractor a more favorable method of
achieving its objective; consequently, lower contract prices can result. Thus, the
owner not only lowers costs by having the work performed sooner with lower labor
and material costs, but it also benefits from the contractor's bidding under more
favorably perceived circumstances. This is true for both construction management
and design-build/fast track techniques, whether used singly or in combination.
Construction Management

A.

Construction management is a flexible term encompassing a wide variety of
owner-manager-contractor relationships. 6 For the specialty contractor, it usually
6.

See Hart, Construction Mfanagement-CMJor Short-The New Namefor an Old Game, 8 FORUM 210, 215
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means that the owner has contracted with a professional construction management
firm that will administer and manage the design and construction of the project
but will not perform any actual construction duties. It also means that the owner
7
will enter into individual prime contracts with each of the specialty contractors.
This is in contrast to the conventional contracting system in which the specialty
trade contractor has no contractual relationship with the owner.
The adminstrative and managerial duties of the construction manager (CM)
typically include: acting as the owner's on-site representative, providing a liaison
between the owner and the specialty contractors, administering the project
schedule, and providing a quality- and cost-control system. 8 The American Institute of Architects' General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, Construction Management Edition, 9 which forms the basis of many owner-trade contractor
contracts, specifies the CM's duties as including: acting as the owner's representative during construction and until the issuance of final payment, 10 reviewing and
processing all applications for payment by the contractors,"1 rejecting work that
does not conform to the contract (subject to the architects' review),' 2 and
reviewing shop drawings and samples.' 3 Of particular significance to specialty
contractors is the CM's obligation to schedule and coordinate the work: "The
Construction Manager will schedule and coordinate the Work of all contractors on
the Project."' 4 While the specialty contractor is required to submit an estimated
schedule,' 5 often based upon contract-specified start and completion dates, the
CM must then take that trade schedule and incorporate it into the schedule for the
6
entire project.'
For the specialty trade contractor, the CM's assumption of such duties ideally
offers more profitable projects through improved project management and coordination. This expectation arises from the basic premise of the construction management system: a professional on-site manager whose sole function is to guide the
project to an efficient completion. Unlike a traditional prime contractor, the CM
typically contracts on a cost-plus basis with no production responsibilities. Thus,
instead of being subject to a prime contractor whose primary concern is the management and profitability of its own work, the specialty contractor is subject to a
CM whose sole task is to administer all the work for the overall benefit of the
project.
(1972); Nash & Love, Innovatins in Federal Constructin Contracting, 45 GEo. WAsit. L. RE \. 309. 365 n. 137
(1977).
7. Although less common, the CM, instead of the owner, may enter into the individual prime
contracts.
8. See John E. Green Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Turner Constr. Co., 500 F. Supp. 910, 910-11 (E.D.
Mich. 1980); Nash & Love, supra note 6, at 365.
9. American Institute of Architects, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, Doc.
A201/CM (constr. management ed. June 1980) [hereinafter cited as AIA/CM General Conditions].
10. Id. art. 2.3.2.
11. Id art. 2.3.8.
12. Id art. 2.3.6.
13. Id art. 2.3.17.
14. Id. art. 2.3.7.
15. Id.art. 4.10.1.
16. Id.
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Further, under the construction management system, the owner-not a general
prime contractor-contracts directly with each specialty trade contractor. This
arrangement has two results. First, each specialty trade contractor is on an equal
footing relative to the other project contractors. Second, the specialty trade contractor is subject to only one contract. Thus, progress payments and retainage
cannot be unjustifiably withheld by an intermediate prime contractor. More
importantly, because of its direct contract with the owner, a specialty trade contractor is not likely to be affected by an owner's deteriorating relationship with
other trade contractors or even with the CM. Consequently, the owner's termination of another trade contractor, or even the CM, would not likewise terminate all
speicialty contractors.
B.

Design-Build/Fast Track

Design-build and fast track are related construction techniques which, like construction management, seek to shorten total project time. Under the design-build
system, an owner awards an entire project to a single entity. 7 That entity then
designs and constructs the project. The designer and builder may be the same
firm, but more often the designer subcontracts segments or trade portions of the
project to various specialty contractors. By controlling the design and the award
of the various construction or trade segments of the project, the designer can start
the initial construction work prior to the completion or refinement of the total
project design. 8
The fast track technique similarly operates to start construction prior to the
completion of the project design. In a fast track project, however, the owner typically hires an architect/engineer to design the project in a series of trade or bid
packages. The owner or its agent (not the designer as in design-build) then solicits
bids and awards the various bid packages to specialty contractors. Like designbuild, however, the fast track technique does permit the owner to award and order
the start of the initial phases of trade work while the designer completes or refines
the later stages of the project design.
For the specialty trade contractors, both techniques divide the total project
into segments, usually based on the traditional specialties. The initial project
work, such as excavation and foundations, is designed and construction is begun
before the completion of the total project design. Thereafter, as the initial trade
contractors make sufficient progress or complete their segments, the follow-on
trade contractors commence their operations. Thus, both techniques are generally
classified as forms of phased construction. A recent decision of the General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals likened phased construction
to a procession of vehicles moving along a highway. Each vehicle represents a prime contractor whose place in the procession has been pre-determined. The progress of each
vehicle, except that of the lead vehicle, is dependent on the progress of the vehicle ahead.
The milestone dates have been likened to mileage markers posted along the highway. Each
vehicle is required to pass the mileage markers at designated times in order to insure steady
progress. 19
17.
18.
19.

See generally Nash & Love, supra note 6, at 350.
Id
Pierce Assocs., 77-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 12,746, at 61,941 (1977).
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It is the "procession" of trade contractors commencing work prior to completion of the project design which shortens the total project time and reduces the
owner's costs. In this regard, it is important to note that the design-build/fast
track approach refers to the entire construction project. One portion is designed
and construction is begun while the design of another portion is being finished. It
does not mean that a single segment is concurrently designed and constructed.
Thus, the individual trade contractor should expect that its bid package design
will be accurate and adequate to construct its particular trade portion of the
project.
As with construction management, design-build/fast track techniques give a
specialty trade contractor the reasonable expectation of less costly, more profitable
work. In this instance, however, the expectation arises from the quality of the
design documents. Indeed, to the individual trade contractor, the designbuild/fast track techniques promise better design documents than the traditional
system. Under the latter, the trade contractor must review the entire set of plans
and specifications to identify the scope of its work. 20 In contrast, dividing the total
project design into specific trade packages, each with a definite and readily identifiable scope of work, enables each specialty trade contractor to identify and to bid
its trade work more accurately. Further, the specialty trade contractors can anticipate that a designer's individual consideration, design, and review of each trade
package will minimize design errors and omissions.
Although on first inspection it might seem that the design-build/fast track
system would introduce more changes to the work than the traditional system, 2'
this should not typically be the case. Changes occur on virtually every major construction project. They result from unavoidable errors and omissions in preparing
the plans and specifications, changes in the owner's needs, and improvements in
technology. The traditional owner-prime contractor construction contract allows
for such changes. Indeed, standard construction documents such as the American
Institute of Architects' General Conditions of the Contract for Construction set
forth the procedure for pricing changes on conventional projects. 22 Similar provisions are incorporated into the American Institute of Architects standard subcon24
tract form, 23 while the AIA/CM Conditions contain almost identical terms.
On a design-build/fast track or construction management project, a trade contractor is bidding on a custom-made design package which should be as accurately
and adequately designed before bid as is a conventional project design. Consequently, a trade contractor should not anticipate any more changes than it would
20. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
21. The design-build/fast track method has the potential for increasing the number of changes or
revisions during construction because early construction phases are in progress or even complete before the
design of the later or last phases is complete. See Armour & Co. v. Scott, 360 F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
22. American Institute of Architects, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, Doc.
A201, art. 12 (Aug. 1976), repritted in BUSINESSMAN'S GUtIDE TO CONSTRUCTION 198 (1980).
23. See AIA Contractor-Subcontractor Agreement, supra note 4, art. 11.9.1.
24. See AIA/CM General Conditions, supra note 9, art. 12.
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expect on a conventional project. The trade contractor should anticipate, however, faster and fairer resolution of changes because it is submitting its changes
directly to the owner-not to an intermediate prime contractor (whose first consideration is to process its own change requests).
In summary, the anticipated benefits of construction management and designbuild/fast track, either singly or in combination, suggest a significant improvement over the traditional construction contracting system. The actualities of the
nonconventional techniques, however, are often far short of trade contractors'
expectations.
IV
ACTUAL EXPERIENCE OF SPECIALTY CONTRACTORS ON
CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT AND DESIGN-BUILD/FAST

TRACK PROJECTS
While the construction management and design-build/fast track approaches

still generate owners' expectations of lower costs and shorter performance time, the
specialty contractors are finding the realities of these nontraditional construction

techniques to be quite the opposite. In project after project, specialty trade contractors have experienced significant delays and cost overruns due to the failure of
owners, CMs, and designers to fulfill the obligations imposed on them by the nonconventional techniques. The ultimate result has been a proliferation of expensive
and lengthy litigation.
A.

Construction Management

Regardless of a trade contractor's general expectations of a construction management project, its rights and obligations on any particular project are defined in
large part by its contract with the owner. The typical trade contract imposes on
trade contractors basically the same obligations which they would have had as
traditional subcontractors. The trade contractor must perform in accordance with
the contract documents, 25 select and supervise its labor force,2 6 determine the construction means, methods, and procedures, 2 7 obey all applicable laws, ordinances,
and buildings codes, 28 prepare shop drawings, 29 purchase materials, and take all
other steps to assure the successful completion of its work, 30 all in accordance with
3
the schedule in its contract. '
One task, however, that neither the individual specialty contractor nor all the
specialty contractors together can be required to perform is to schedule and coordinate the work of the other contractors. Logically, only the CM should schedule
the overall project work; indeed, it should be and is the CM's primary function.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

arts. 4.3.3, 4.5.1.
arts. 4.4.1, 4.3.2.
art. 4.3.1.
art. 4.7.2.
art. 4.12.4.
art. 4.4.1.
art. 8.2.2.
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The CM alone has the total picture of the project, as well as the contractual
authority to control its orderly and timely completion. In contrast, the specialty
trade contractors, individually or collectively, are not in a position of project overview, nor do they have contractual control over the architect/engineer or each
,other.
Unfortunately, it is in the very effort and execution of scheduling and coordination that the construction management system has faltered. The failure takes
three forms. First, owners and their CM's have attempted to place the contractual
burden of scheduling and coordination on the trade contractors. Second, the
owner-trade contract provisions have often sought to absolve the owner from liability for its own or its CM's poor scheduling. Third, many CMs, even though
recognizing their contractual duties, have failed to schedule or to administer and
to enforce effectively the established schedules.
1. Shifting the Duty of Scheduling and Coordination. The very purpose of the construction management technique is thwarted if the owner or the CM seeks to
impose the duty of scheduling and coordination on the individual trade contractors. Nevertheless, on many projects the owners and CMs have sought to shift the
duty of scheduling and coordination to the individual trade contractors. 32 The
result, of course, has been chaos.
Fortunately, it appears that the courts and boards of contract appeals recognize that the owner and CM must bear at least some responsibility for project
scheduling and coordination, 33 unless the trade contracts provide otherwise. In a
recent decision, the General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals
wrote:
The Government can decide on whatever method of construction and contracting it
chooses, but, in doing so, it also assumes the responsibilities inherent in its choice. With
phased construction, it is obvious that the contracting officer has the obligation and duty to
demand that the various contractors cooperate34with the construction schedule and not
interfere with the work of any other contractor.

The duty and responsibility of scheduling and coordination remain with the
owner or CM even though the specialty trade contractor's contract may require it
to coordinate its work with that of other trade contractors. 25 This is not to say,
however, that the specialty trade contractor has no responsibility. Each trade contractor must schedule its material deliveries and coordinate its own forces in conjunction with the progress of its work. 36 Moreover, the specialty trade contractor

32. See, e.g., Jacobson & Co., 80-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 14,521 (1980); Pierce Assocs., 77-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
12,746 (1977).
33. See Gateway Erectors Div. v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 102 11. App. 3d 300, 302, 430 N.E.2d 20. 21
(1981); see also L.L. Hall Constr. Co. v. United States, 379 F.2d 559 (Ct. CI. 1966): Hoffman v. United
States, 340 F.2d 645 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 726 (Ct. Cl.
1957); Jacobson & Co., 80-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 14,521, at 71,565 (1980): Pierce Assocs., 77-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
12,746 (1977).

34. Jacobson & Co., 80-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
14,521, at 71,565 (1980).
35. See, e.g., Paccon, Inc. v. United States, 399 F.2d 162 (Ct. CI. 1968): John A. Johnson & Sons v.
United States, 180 F.2d 969 (Ct. Cl. 1967): Hoffman v. United States, 340 F.2d 645 (Ct- CI. 1964).
Jacobson & Co., 80-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 14,521 (1980); Pierce Assocs., 77-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
12,746 (1977).
36. Gaede & Bynum, The Afuli-hrunejob, 79-3 CONSI-RUCTION BRIFIN;S, May 1979. at 7.
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must inform the owner or the CM of its progress and future sequence of operations. 37 Once informed, however, the owner and CM have the legal and logical
responsibility to utilize that knowledge and authority to schedule and coordinate
all trade contractors' work from project start to completion. 38
2. Absolution from Damagesfor Delay. While contractually obligated to schedule
and to coordinate the project work, many owners and CMs have sought to absolve
themselves from all responsibility for the fulfillment of those duties. This is most
often attempted by the inclusion of a "no damages for delay" clause in the trade
contracts. Alternatively, some trade contracts have directed trade contractors to
look to one another for recovery of delay damages.
"No damages for delay" clauses are a common fixture of traditional project
prime contracts and subcontracts. 39 Generally, coutractors, including prime contractors and subcontractors on traditional projects and trade contractors on construction management projects, each have a contractual right to recover damages
for delays which result from the acts or omissions of the parties administering their
contracts. 40 Owners and their CMs, however, utilize a "no damages for delay"
clause in an attempt to preclude contractually the trade contractors' right to
recover such damages. Typically, the clauses are structured to limit trade contractors' remedies for any delays to noncompensable time extensions regardless of
4
cause, duration, or cost of the delays. '
While courts do recognize the validity of "no damages for delay" clauses, they
will not enforce the clauses without exception or limitation. 42 In fact, traditional
construction project contractors bearing the responsibility for scheduling and coordination may overcome such clauses and recover delay damages when: (i) the
delay was neither intended nor contemplated by the contracting parties to be
within the terms of the particular clause; (ii) the delay resulted from fraud, misrepresentation, or other bad faith by the party seeking the protection of the clause;
(iii) the delay was of such unreasonable length as would amount to an abandonment of the contract; or (iv) the delay resulted from the other party's active inter43
ference with or hinderance of contract performance.
37.
38.
39.

Id
Id; see AIA/CM General Conditions, supra note 9, art. 2.3.7.
Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 187, 194-96 (1976); see also Comment, No Damages Clauses in Construction Contracts.- A Critique, 53 WASH. L. REv. 471 (1978) (government contracts).
40. See L.L. Hall Constr. Co. v. United States, 379 F.2d 559 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
41. For example, "no damages for delay" clauses are commonly worded as follows:
In the event the Subcontractor is delayed in the commencement, prosecution or completion of its
work by any act, omission, neglect or default of the Owner, Prime Contractor or of anyone employed
by them, or of any other subcontractor or third party on the Project, or by any damage caused by fire
or other casualty or by any extraordinary conditions arising out of war or governmental actions, or by
any other cause all beyond the control and without the fault or neglect of Subcontractor, then Subcontractor shall be entitled to a noncompensable time extension only.
While the wording typically varies, in each case one party is seeking to preclude claims for impact and
delay costs for which it might otherwise have contractual liability.
42. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 668 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1982); Blake
Constr. Co. v. C.J. Coakley Co., 431 A.2d 569 (D.C. 1981); City of Seattle v. Dyad Constr., 17 Wash. App.
501, 565 P.2d 423 (1977).
43. See United States Steel Corp. v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 668 F.2d 435, 438 (8th Cir. 1982); Blake

Page 39: Winter 19831

SPECIALTY TRADE (PRIME) CONTRACTORS

Although the exceptions to "no damages for delay" clauses have arisen almost
exclusively in cases involving traditional construction contracts, these exceptions
are logically applicable in the construction management context as well. In
applying the exceptions listed above, courts have based their decisions on a factual
investigation of what the parties contemplated, and the cause and length of the
delay. 4 4 In the construction management context, such an investigation would
reveal that the construction management technique was developed to shorten construction time and that the CM is the party with ultimate scheduling authority. It
would also expose the relative impotence of the trade contractors to control the
overall project schedule. Such findings would lead to a more lenient threshold for
invoking the exceptions to enforcing "no damages for delay" clauses on construction management projects.
Moreover, given the authority of the CM, it seems logical that any act or
failure on the CM's part which delays a trade contractor could be regarded as
"active interference," an exception to the "no damages for delay" clause. 4 5 Also,
given that the purpose of the construction management system is to shorten construction time by more efficient management, any delay should be regarded "as
beyond the comtemplation of the parties," or "of an unreasonable duration" per
46
se, either of which constitutes an exception to the "no damages for delay" clause.
The only case reported to date in the construction management context isJohn
E. Green Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Turner Constructon Co. 47 In that case, a trade
contractor sued the CM for intentional interference with his contract. The CM
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the "no damages for delay"
clause in the specialty contract barred the contractor's action. The court, applying
Michigan law, listed the standard exceptions to the "no damages for delay" clause
and determined that proof of the allegations in the complaint could establish that
the CM had intentionally interfered with the contractor's performance. 48 Thus,
summary judgment was denied. Unfortunately, the court did not discuss the factual allegations which led to its conclusion that active interference could be
established.
As an alternative to the "no damages for delay" clause, some owners and their
CM's have relied upon contract clauses which require a delayed trade contractor
Constr. Co. v. C.J. Coakley Co., 431 A.2d 569, 578-79 (D.C. 1981). See generally Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 187
(1976).
44. See cases cited supra note 43. If an injured party cannot fit the facts of his delay damages claim
into one of the recognized exceptions, the courts and boards will not hesitate to recognize the barring effect
of a "no damages for delay" clause. See, e.g., City of Houston v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 570 S.W.2d 75 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1978); Western Eng'rs, Inc. v. State Board Comm'n, 20 Utah 2d 294, 437 P.2d 216 (1968).
45. Article 4.10.1 of the AIA/CM General Conditions, supra note 9, specifies that the CM shall coordinate the contractor's progress schedule with the schedule for the entire project. Article 2.3.7 of the
AIA/CM General Conditions, supra note 9, further specifies that the CM is responsible for scheduling and
coordinating the work of all contractors on the project. Should the CM fail to meet these responsibilities,
thereby disrupting the trade contractors' work, it is more than a simple mistake, error in judgment, lack of
total effort or lack of complete diligence; it is active interference.
46. For an example of a delay of "unreasonable duration" under a traditional contract, see E.C.
Nolan Co. v. State, 58 Mich. App. 294, 227 N.W.2d 323 (1975).
47. 500 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
48. Id at 913.
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to recover damages from the contractor who was responsible for the delay. In one
of the first construction management cases litigated under such facts, Pierce Associales, 49 the U.S. Government attempted to absolve itself and its CM from responsibility for any delays by citing to the following clause included in all the trade
contracts, which in effect directed a damaged contractor to seek recovery from the
other project trade contractors:
Should the contractor sustain any damage through any act or omission of any other contractor having a contract with the Government for the performance of work upon the site
or of work which may be necessary to be performed for the proper prosecution of the work
to be performed hereunder, or through any act or omission of a subcontractor of such contractor, the contractor shall have no claim against the Government or the Government's
consultants for such damage, but shall have a right to recover such damage from the other
contractor under the provision similar to the following50provisions which has been or will be
inserted in the contracts with such other contractors.

The General Services Adminstration Board of Contract Appeals held that the
contractor could recover delay damages from the Government regardless of the
exculpatory contract language, basing its decision on the fact that the Government
contracting officer had an affirmative duty to schedule the work. 5 1
The New Jersey courts have absolved the owner and its scheduling consultant
from any liability for failure to coordinate when one of the multiple contractors,
the general construction contractor, had specifically agreed in its contract to coordinate and schedule all construction work. In two cases arising out of the same
project, Edwin j. Dobson, Jr., Inc. v. Rutgers 52 and Broadway Maintenance Corp. v.
Rutgers, 53 the courts looked to the plain language of the contract awarded the general construction contractor, Frank J. Briscoe Co., Inc., and ruled that Briscoe had
expressly agreed to coordinate the work of all contractors on the project. The
courts further noted that each of the multiple trade contracts, including Briscoe's,
provided that the specialty trade contractors would rely on the general construction contractor to supervise, direct, control, and manage the project to completion.
Under such circumstances, the courts held that the specialty trade contractors
could not bring an action against the owner for a failure to coordinate.
Such rulings show little inconsistency with the ruling in Pierce Associates. In
Pierce Associates, the government attempted to contract away liability, yet its contract was silent on the issue of coordination responsibility. In Dobson and Broadway
Maintenance, the owner not only contracted away liability, but also the responsibility of coordination. From these decisions, it seems clear that the party bearing
the duty of coordination, either expressly or impliedly, will be liable for damages
resulting from a breach of that duty.
3. Construction Manager's Failure to Maintain and Enforce the Project Schedule. The
third major difficulty with construction management contracts has been the CM's
failure to maintain and enforce the project schedule in the field. Scheduling is a
49.

77-2 B.C.A. (CCH) $ 12,746 (1977).

50. Id at 61,939.
51. Id at 61,943.
52. 157 N.J. Super. 357, 384 A.2d 1121 (1978).
53. 180 N.J. Super. 350, 434 A.2d 1125 (1981) (per curiam).
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three-step process: 1) preparing a schedule; 2) updating the original schedule to
recognize jobsite reality; and 3) assuring compliance with the current schedule.
The first and second steps are nothing more than the drafting and calculating of a
reasonable schedule in accordance with the owner's needs and then updating the
schedule to reflect accurately the jobsite conditions and progress.
The third step is the most difficult: enforcement of the current updated project
schedule to assure that each contractor starts and completes his work on time as
well as in conjunction with the progress of the other trade contractors. In Perce
Associates,54 the board of contract appeals described this duty as follows:
The normal bidder, told that the Government will set the priorities for another contractor
in terms of the bidder's own performance, and scaled to his work ('so that the turnover of
houses will be accomplished at the same time as the turnover of applicable related utilities')
would naturally think that the Government would follow through on the priority schedule,
so far as it reasonably could. The normal bidder, anxious for reassurance, would hardly be
satisfied with a paper schedule, not to be enforced or policed in any way by the defendant.
He would certainly assume that this
is not all the Government promised, and he would be
55
entitled to make that assumption.

Although the Government argued in Pierce Associates that it could not be held
responsible for the delays of preceding contractors, the board of contract appeals
squarely placed such responsibility on the Government and its construction manager. In denying the Government's motion for reconsideration, the board wrote:
The Government also points out that the Board's decision will either subject it to multiple
litigation by requiring it to first defend itself against the aggrieved contractor and then sue
to collect damages from the inefficient contractor or contractors, or force it to abandon use
of the phased construction contract altogether. The choice of which type of contract to
utilize for a particular project is, of course, the Government's. Since every form of contracting has some disadvantages and requires the Government to assume some responsibility, it is up to the Government to consider the alternatives and decide which type of
contract would work most successfully for any given project. The Board neither forces the
use or abandonment of any particular form of contracting nor creates unnecessary litigation, but merely
decides appeals in accordance with the contract that the parties have
56
agreed upon.

The duty of the owner and the CM to schedule and coordinate is clear. It .is
when the CM attempts to contract away that duty, or to limit its liability when it
breaches that duty, or actually breaches that duty, that the trade contractors are
most often disappointed in their reasonable expectations of the construction management system.
B.

Design-Build/Fast Track

As set forth above, a design-build/fast track project should give the bidding
trade contractor the reasonable expectation of having a better and more complete
set of plans for his portion of the work than under a traditional subcontract. 57 In
too many instances trade contractors have found plans to be far less satisfactory
than anticipated. First, the plans and specifications contain more, not fewer,
54.
55.
56.

77-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 12,746 (1977).
Id at 61,942-43 (quoting from Paccon, Inc. v. United States, 399 F.2d 162, 169-70 (Ct. Cl. 1968)).
Id at 63,862 (1978).

57.

See supra p. 45.
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defects than traditional project designs. Second, the individual bid packages often
do not together constitute a whole project. Both problems seem to have their bases
in one cause-premature release of the individual bid packages to the specialty
contractors.
It is, of course, the purpose of design-build/fast track techniques to shorten the
total duration of the construction process. Thus, the sooner the first bid packages
are released, the sooner construction can commence. If the early bid packages are
released before the package designs are complete, however, the project may commence at an earlier date, but it is almost certainly doomed to be completed at a
much later date than anticipated, and usually at a much greater cost.
When the owner or its agent issues the initial trade packages (caissons, excavation, foundations) before the package designs are complete, the contractor will
experience many more changes than would normally be expected. This is true
because the changes will be developmental changes as well as corrections of errors
and omissions. Developmental changes are those which are found to be necessary
as the design of the project continues. Corrections of errors and omissions are
changes to correct engineering or design mistakes. These problems occur even on
traditional projects, but they are multiplied when bid package plans and specifications are released before the package design has been completed and thoroughly
checked for accuracy.
An often more serious problem occurs when the various bid packages together
do not constitute the entire project or are based on different dimensions or criteria.
An example of this occurs when a trade contractor is required to build on prior
work, portions of which are simply omitted or forgotten in the design of the bid
packages and now do not exist in the field. A more common example has been the
discovery of many trade contractors that standard construction tolerances, even
when referenced in the bid package plans and specifications, have not actually
been taken into account by the trade package designers. Consequently, trade contractors can perform their trade work as specified yet find that work supposedly
compatible by design is incompatible in the field. Similarly, separate trade package designs prepared by different individuals within the designer's office may
depict a common area, yet the dimensions or elevations conflict.
The result of these shortcomings, especially when discovered after work has
commenced, is delay of the project and severe increases in the contractors' performance cost. Each change to overcome a particular shortcoming has to be
processed through the construction manager to the architect/engineer and
returned to the contractor. When the discovery and processing occurs prior to
construction, the impact on contractors is lessened but not eliminated. When it
occurs during actual construction, so that labor forces have to cease work and wait
for new instructions, it can easily double or triple the cost of performance. 5
To compound the problem, owners, their CMs, and designers tend to rely
solely on the procedures for changes which are set forth in the trade contracts.
58. Often the very inflation savings which are sought by initiating construction during design are lost
while awaiting clarifications and revisions.
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These procedures entitle the trade contractors to compensation for the changes.
Indeed, most trade contracts contain very detailed provisions for calculating and
processing change orders.59 The dilemma of many design-build/fast track projects
has been that the changes are so numerous in comparison to the original project
trade work that the trade contract's calculation provisions in no way account for
the incurred impact and loss-of-efficiency costs.
In order to circumvent many owners' refusals to recognize impact costs, trade
contractors have sought recovery under a theory of "cardinal change." 6 A cardinal change occurs when the number and/or nature of changes is so great that
the project is deemed to be totally different from the project at the time of bid. 6 1
In at least one fast track case, the court allowed the contractor to recover its inefficiency costs due to the sheer volume of changes even though the court did not
address whether the quantity and type of changes constitutes a "cardinal
62
change."
C.

Combined Effect of Construction Management and Design-Build/Fast
Track

When the construction management and design-build/fast track methods are
utilized together on a single project, the shortcomings of each technique are compounded. It is not uncommon on such projects for an owner or a CM which is
under pressure to commence work to issue bid packages for construction prematurely. The bid package designs may be incomplete or the trade contractors may
be notified to proceed before the project can accommodate them. Such events can
only lead to delays which in turn delay follow-on contractors. The trade contractors then find themselves confronted with "no damages for delay" clauses or other
exculpatory language. Although, as set forth above, courts and boards of contract
appeals have allowed remedies for these problems, such remedies are no substitute
for the frustrated expectations of both the owner and the specialty contractor. The
owner has not achieved its savings of time and costs, and the contractor has been
made whole, if at all, only after extensive and expensive litigation.
V
CONCLUSION

To date, nonconventional construction methods have not met the expectations
of trade contractors. The problem does not, however, seem to be in the techniques.
The techniques are valid and can work. The failures result from the owners',
CMs', and designers' refusals to accept or fulfill their respective responsibilities
under a system created and implemented for their benefit.
It is a fact that owners select construction management and design-build/fast
59. See supra notes 22-24.
60. See, e.g., Edward R. Marden Corp. v. United States, 442 F.2d 364 (Ct. CI. 1971).
61. Id at 369.
62. See E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 476 F. Supp. 729 (W.D. Pa. 1979), modifed, 626 F.2d 324 (3d
Cir. 1980).
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track procedures to save time and reap financial benefits. The expectation that
the owners create and intend to create is that of a fairer, more efficient system for
the trade contractors than the traditional contracting procedure. Indeed, if the
owners did not create such an expectation, the result would be higher bids and no
cost savings for the owners.
If owners are willing to accept the benefits of the nonconventional construction
techniques, they must also be willing to accept the consequences of their own acts
and omissions. None of the nonconventional construction techniques is a panacea
for an owner's or its team's rejection or breach of their duties. If, in an effort to
save time, the owner or its team releases bid packages before the individual packages are complete, and subsequent changes occur, the owner must pay. Likewise,
the owner must not attempt to avoid its responsibilities for delays which it has
agreed to prevent. If the owner and his team perform their responsibilities, the
owner and the trade contractors will achieve their expectations. If, however, the
owner or its team does not meet its responsibilities, the owner must compensate the
contractor. It is as much a part of the bargain for the owner as are the anticipated
cost savings.

